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ABSTRACT
The Board of Veterans Appeals exists to decide questions of whether U.S.
military veterans were improperly denied benefits from Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Offices around the country. The Board hears thousands of cases each year, where veterans are given the option to present
new evidence and arguments in support of their claims at non-adversarial
hearings before the Board Member tasked with reviewing their claim. In
Cook v. Snyder, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims determined
a veteran was not precluded from seeking a subsequent hearing before the
Board at a new stage of the adjudication process. This Article analyzes the
holding in Cook to find it may be interpreted broadly or narrowly in future
cases and concludes that absent further guidance from the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, claimants are left with an ambiguous standard for whether
they are entitled to more than one hearing during the appeals process.
INTRODUCTION
The Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”), which makes final appellate
determinations within the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) disability
benefits claims system, rendered 55,713 decisions during fiscal year 2015,
1
the last year for which data is available. The Board conducted hearings,
where the veteran was afforded the opportunity to offer testimony in support of his or her claim directly to the member of the Board tasked with de2
ciding it, in 12,738 of those decisions. In 1988, when proposing the statutory right to a hearing now codified by 38 U.S.C. § 7107(b), the Senate
Veterans’ Affairs Committee observed there was a correlation between
3
hearings before the Board and successful claims.
In Cook v. Snyder, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims (“Court”) addressed the meaning 38 U.S.C § 7107(b). The statute
reads: “The Board shall decide any appeal only after affording the appellant
4
an opportunity for a hearing.” The question the Court addressed was

1

Bd. of Veteran’s Appeals, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2015 5 (2016), http://www.bva.va.gov/docs
/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2015AR.pdf.
2
563 hearings took place at the Board, 4,566 took place at regional offices when members of the Board
traveled there for the purposes of conducting hearings, and 7,609 took place by video conference where
the veteran communicated from their local regional office with a member of the Board in Washington,
D.C. See id. at 28.
3
Cook v. Snyder, 28 Vet. App. 330, 336-337 (2017) (noting that in fiscal year 1987, 19.5% of claims
heard by a Board member in Washington, D.C. were granted and 30.6% of claims heard by Board members at travel hearings were granted, compared to an overall grant rate of 12.8%.).
4
38 U.S.C. § 7107(b) (2017).
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whether the phrase “an opportunity for a hearing” was properly read in the
singular, i.e. whether entitlement to one hearing is all the VA must provide
before rendering a decision on a veteran’s claim for disability benefits, or if
that veteran is entitled to additional hearings upon request during different
stages of the proceedings.
Each claim for VA disability benefits begins with the veteran filing a
claim with their local VA Regional Office (“RO”). When the RO makes a
decision, they will also notify the claimant of the right to initiate the appeals
5
process. In order to begin the appeal, the veteran must submit a “notice of
6
disagreement” within one year of an unfavorable decision. If the RO con7
tinues to deny the claim, the veteran can appeal the denial to the Board.
When appealing to the Board, the veteran may indicate whether he or she
wishes to be afforded a hearing before the Board renders a decision on their
8
claim.
The hearings are intended to be informal and non-adversarial, and are intended to give the veteran an opportunity to provide any information they
feel is relevant and material to their claim. The Board member conducting
the hearing has the duty to “explain fully the issues and suggest the submission of evidence which the claimant may have overlooked and which would
9
be of advantage to the claimant’s position.” A transcript of the hearing will
be produced and added to the veteran’s claims file for consideration before
10
the Board renders a decision. If the Board renders a negative decision and
the veteran remains unsatisfied, he or she may then file an appeal with the
Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of Board decisions and
11
has the power to reverse, remand or affirm the Board’s decision.
In Cook, the Court addressed the interpretation of the phrase “an opportunity for a hearing,” specific to a situation where the veteran sought an additional hearing following an earlier remand of his claim from the Court.
The Court addressed whether this phrase meant that the veteran was precluded from a second hearing at a separate stage of his appeal, after initially
being provided one as part of his initial appeal to the Board. The Court’s
holding, that Mr. Cook was not precluded from a second hearing, applies
much more broadly to a veteran’s right to present sworn testimony in the

5

38 C.F.R. 38 § 19.25 (2017).
38 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1) (2017).
7
38 C.F.R. § 19.25 (2017).
8
38 C.F.R. § 20.700(e) (2016).
9
38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2) (2016).
10
38 C.F.R. § 20.714 (2016).
11
38 U.S.C. §§ 7251-52, 7266 (2016).
6

Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2017

3

Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 7
Do Not Delete

282

4/20/17 11:35 PM

RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XX:iii

process of VA adjudication of his or her claim, but still leaves certain questions unanswered. It also offers important guidance on the question of what
deference is owed to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs in his interpretation
and application of VA’s regulations.
I. BACKGROUND OF MR. COOK’S CASE
Edward Cook (“the Veteran”) served in the United States Navy in
12
1972 and 1973. His service medical records indicated that he experienced
low back pain while in service and at one point was diagnosed with a mild
13
muscle pull. Mr. Cook filed a claim for service connection at his local RO
in May 2000, asserting that his current back disability was caused by or re14
lated to the back injury suffered during his time in service. His claim was
denied, and in 2006 he sought to reopen it. In 2007, the RO denied his request because it determined the evidence submitted was not new and mate15
rial and therefore did not justify reopening the previously denied claim.
16

Mr. Cook appealed the denial to the Board. Separately, Mr. Cook
filed a new claim with the RO seeking entitlement to total disability based
on individual unemployability (“TDIU”), which was also denied by the RO
17
and which he also appealed to the Board.
In June 2012, Mr. Cook testified at a Board hearing. Following his
testimony about his back problems and their effects on employment, the
Board found that new and material evidence had been submitted, which
warranted reopening his claim, and remanded the claim to the RO for fur18
ther evidentiary development. After the RO received additional evidence
and Mr. Cook underwent a VA examination, it continued to deny his claim

12

Cook v. Snyder, 28 Vet. App. 330, 333 (2017)
Id.
14
Id.; see also 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2016).
15
Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 333; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (2016) (“A claimant may reopen a finally adjudicated claim by submitting new and material evidence. New evidence means existing evidence not
previously submitted to agency decision makers. Material evidence means existing evidence that, by
itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to
substantiate the claim.”).
16
Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 333.
17
Id.; see also 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a) (2016) (“Total disability ratings for compensation may be assigned,
where the schedular rating is less than total, when the disabled person is, in the judgment of the rating
agency, unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as a result of service-connected
disabilities”).
18
Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 333.
13
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for service connection and entitlement to TDIU. Mr. Cook then requested
20
a new Board hearing to provide further testimony.
The Board issued a new decision in February 2014 that continued to
21
deny the Veteran’s claims. It acknowledged Mr. Cook’s request for a
hearing, but denied it, stating that because he had already been afforded a
22
Board hearing, no further hearing was necessary. Mr. Cook appealed this
23
denial to the Court. In October 2014, the Court granted a joint motion for
remand filed by the parties and sent the appeal back to the Board on the
grounds that it failed to address favorable evidence in its previous deci24
sion. Following this, Mr. Cook again requested a Board hearing to present
25
additional testimony in support of his claim.
Mr. Cook was not afforded an additional hearing, and the Board ren26
dered a new decision denying his claim in February 2015. In its decision,
the Board specifically noted that because the Veteran had previously been
afforded a hearing before the Board in June 2012, no further hearing was
27
necessary. The Veteran again appealed this denial, which lead to the
28
Court’s precedential decision.
II. DISCUSSION OF THE COURT’S HOLDING
The parties set forth two very differing arguments on the narrow
question of whether the Board properly determined that Mr. Cook was not
entitled to an additional hearing. Mr. Cook argued that the indefinite article
“a” in § 20.700(a) did not limit a claimant to one hearing, regardless of the
29
number of times the claim was before the Board. The Secretary of Veterans Affairs, on the other hand, argued that “a” usually connotes the singular; that his interpretation of the regulatory language is entitled to deference

19

Id.; see also 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(1).
Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 334.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 334.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.; see generally Frankel v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 23, 25-26 (1990) (demonstrating that the majority
of the decisions the Court issues are Single Judge Decisions binding only on the parties that may not be
cited as precedent.).
29
Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 335; 38 C.F.R. § 20.700(a)(2016)(“A hearing on appeal will be granted if an
appellant, or an appellant's representative acting on his or her behalf, expresses a desire to appear in person.”.).
20
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to the extent the language could be considered ambiguous; and that Mr.
30
Cook’s interpretation of the regulation would lead to “absurd results.”
As with any question of statutory interpretation, the Court applied the
test set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
31
Inc. It determined that “both parties advanced grammatically plausible
readings of the sentence, ‘the Board shall decide any appeal only after affording the appellant an opportunity for a hearing,’” and reached the con32
clusion that “the statute’s language is simply not clear on this point.”
Thus, it determined that 38 U.S.C. § 7107(b) was ambiguous with respect to
33
the question of whether a veteran may be afforded more than one hearing.
Further, it found that the regulation identified by the Secretary which implemented the statutory provision, 38 C.F.R. § 20.700(a), did not speak to
the ambiguity at issue because it contained the same basic ambiguous lan34
guage as the statute. As such, the Court declined to apply Chevron defer35
ence to the Secretary’s interpretation of the regulation. Concluding that
Chevron deference was inapplicable, the Court then turned to the test set
forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., and concluded that the Secretary’s inter36
pretation of the language at issue lacked the power to persuade.
After establishing that Skidmore, rather than Chevron applied, the Court
sought to ascertain the meaning of the statute by reading the statute as a
whole. Upon determining that doing so did not eliminate the ambiguity, the
Court looked to the statute’s context with a view to its place in the statutory
37
scheme. The Court noted that a crux of the Veterans Judicial Review Act
(“VJRA”), which established judicial review of VA’s administrative decisions, was that the Court could set aside Board decisions and remand ap38
peals, more than once if necessary. The Court noted, “the focus of a claim

30

Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 335.
Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 338; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984).
32
Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 338.
33
Id. at 339.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 339-340; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S. Ct. 161, 89 L. Ed. 124 (1944).
(“We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while
not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity
of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”).
37
Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 338.
38
Pub.L. 100–687, (The Veteran’s Judicial Review Act of 1988 established the United States Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims); Id. at 339, (The passage of the act “ended the “splendid isolation” in
31
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may change or evolve between an initial Board hearing on the claim and
Board consideration of that claim following remand from the Court,” a
39
principle which proved key to its ultimate holding. The Court determined
that reading the statute as barring a claimant who had previously testified
from receiving a subsequent hearing during further appellate proceedings
would be “neither solicitous of a claimant nor productive of informed Board
40
decision making.”
Against this backdrop, the Court turned to the facts of Mr. Cook’s appeal. Specifically, when Mr. Cook testified before the Board in June 2012,
the Court noted that the issue was whether new and material evidence had
been submitted to reopen the previously denied claim for service connec41
tion for a lumbar spine disability. After the Board agreed to reopen the
42
claim, but denied it again, the issue on appeal had shifted. By the time the
Veteran requested a subsequent Board hearing in November 2014, the issue
was no longer whether he had provided new and material evidence suffi43
cient to reopen the previously denied claim. Rather, the issue was now
whether or not the evidence of record demonstrated that the Veteran’s cur44
rent back problems were linked to his service. At the time Mr. Cook requested his second hearing, he asserted that he had relevant evidence in
45
support of that issue. As the Court noted, to read the statute as prohibiting
him from testifying at a Board hearing where the issue had changed “from
one issue with distinct legal criteria to another” would be inconsistent with
the principles underlying the pro-claimant veterans’ disability appeals proc46
ess.
In concluding that the Board erred by finding Mr. Cook was not entitled
to an additional hearing, the Court was careful to include language in its
holding stating that it was not adopting the argument that he is entitled to a
47
Board hearing “at any time on any issue for any reason.” Instead, it confined its holding to stating simply that a claimant who received a hearing at
one stage of appellate proceedings is not barred from requesting and receiv-

which VA’s administrative decisions, unlike those of other Federal agencies, were “insulated from judicial review.”).
39
Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 342.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 343.
43
Id. at 342-343.
44
Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 342-343.
45
Id. at 343.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 345.
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48

ing a Board hearing during a separate stage. It further indicated that it was
sensitive to the “administrative burden facing the Board in the provision of
49
personal hearings on matters appealed to it.” However, despite such concerns, the Court determined that deferring to the Secretary’s interpretation
of the statute would be ignoring the intent of Congress discerned from the
language of the statute, “the text and context of related statutory and regulatory provisions, and the overall structure of the VJRA, and the solicitous
50
and pro-claimant principles informing veterans’ benefits law.” It further
noted that the Secretary was free to follow public notice and comment
guidelines and promulgate a regulation that resolves the ambiguity in the
51
statute.
III. ANALYSIS
The Court’s holding in Cook is significant in both the clarity it provides
to the question of a how expansive a veteran’s right to a hearing during the
VA claim’s process is, its use of language clarifying that the right does not
extend to entitlement to a hearing “at any time on any issue for any reason,”
and for the questions it leaves unanswered. It is also notable for its detailed
demonstration of the process of interpreting an ambiguous VA regulation
and how such process is unique to the veterans’ disability benefits statutory
and regulatory scheme.
As the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims exists exclusively to provide judicial oversight of VA actions, the Court must always apply the
52
framework set forth in Chevron in interpreting the meaning of any statute.
If the Court determines that Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, it then turns to the agency’s implementing regulation and
must determine whether such regulation is based on a permissible construction of the statute. If so, the Court must apply the framework set forth in
Chevron in reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute which it ad53
ministers. As the implementing regulation in this case contained the same
ambiguous language as the statute, the Court determined that Chevron def54
erence was not appropriate. Turning to the guidelines espoused in Skid-

48

Id.
Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 340.
50
Id. at 345.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 345-346.
53
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843.
54
See id.
49
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more, the Court then addressed whether the Secretary’s interpretation of the
55
statute contained the “power to persuade,” and concluded that it did not.
From there, the Court sought guidance in the statute’s context “with a
56
view to its place in the statutory scheme.” In doing so, the Court turned its
focus to interpretative guidance that is unique to veterans’ benefits jurisprudence and which ultimately guided its decision in Cook. The Court noted
the Supreme Court’s observation that the VA adjudicatory process is designed to function “with a high degree of informality and solicitude for the
57
claimant.” Furthermore, as the Court described, the VA adjudicatory
process is a non-adversarial system that is predicated upon a structure that
provides for notice and an opportunity to be heard throughout every step of
58
the process. Even if the Secretary’s interpretation of a statute is “plausible,” the Court will adopt the Secretary’s interpretation that is less favorable
to the veteran only if the statutory language unambiguously requires it to do
59
so.
The Court held in Trafter v. Shinseki, noting the specificity to the veterans’ benefits scheme:
[If] VA’s interpretation of the statutes is reasonable, the courts are precluded
from substituting their judgment for that of VA, unless the Secretary has exceeded his authority; the Secretary’s action was clearly wrong; or the Secretary’s interpretation is unfavorable to veterans, such that it conflicts with the
beneficence underpinning VA’s veterans benefits scheme, and a more liberal
construction is available that affords a harmonious interplay between provi60
sions.

Put simply, the Court has the ability to “substitute” its judgment for the
Secretary’s only in instances where the Secretary’s interpretation conflicts
with the intended beneficence of the veterans’ benefits scheme.
The Court drew on this ability in Cook to conclude that a veteran who received a hearing at one stage of the proceedings is not barred from receiving another hearing during a separate stage. The “high degree of informality
and solicitude for the claimant,” along with the predication of the VA adjudicatory process on the opportunity to be heard throughout the progression

55

Cook v. Snyder, 28 Vet. App. 330, 338-339 (2017).
Id. at 340.
57
Id. at 341(citing Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S.428, 431 (2011)).
58
Id.
59
Id. (citing Sursely v. Peake, 551 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
60
Trafter v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 267, 272 (2013). (referencing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122
(1994), which also noted that the length of endurance of certain regulations has no bearing on whether it
is consistent with a statute, which is particularly true in veterans’ law given that Congress took so long
to provide for judicial review of VA actions).
56
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of the claim, prompted the Court to determine that reading the statute as a
bar to a subsequent Board hearings at a later stage of the proceedings would
be inconsistent with the stated purpose of a Board hearing in the context of
61
the judicial review process of VA decision making. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit’s guidance, that even a plausible interpretation from the Secretary that is less favorable to the veteran only warrants deference when the
language unambiguously requires that interpretation, freed the Court from
being bound by the Secretary’s interpretation in the present case, even if
62
such interpretation was plausible.
Although the Court declined to defer to the Secretary’s interpretation of
the statute and remanded Mr. Cook’s case to the Board so he could be afforded the additional hearing that he sought, the Court was careful to ex63
plain the limits of its holding. It clarified that the language of the statute
did not entitle the veteran to “a Board hearing at any time on any issue for
64
any reason.” Instead, it limited its holding to a situation such as Mr.
Cook’s, where the veteran was seeking a second hearing at a separate stage
of the appellate proceedings before the Board, namely after the appeal had
already been sent back to the Board by way of a remand order from the
65
Court.
The Court expressed the limits of its holding in the statement that the
claimant is “not barred” from requesting and receiving a second Board
hearing at a separate stage of the proceedings, but did not go as far as to
state that a claimant is “entitled” to an additional hearing simply because a
claim is back in front of the Board following an additional step in the pro66
ceedings. Clearly, the onus remains on the veteran and his or her representative to evaluate the status of the evidentiary development in their claim
and make the determination of whether seeking an additional hearing before
the Board will be worthwhile. The Court acknowledged this near the end of
its decision, and recognized that claimants may opt to forgo opportunities
for Board hearings in the interest of obtaining quicker decisions from the
67
Board.
It is clear from the Court’s holding that veterans have the right to seek an
additional hearing in a situation such as Mr. Cook’s, where the claim is

61

Henderson ex. rel. v. Shinseki, 562, U.S. 428, 431 (2011).
Cook v. Snyder, 28 Vet. App. 330, 345 (2017).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 346.
66
Id. at 345.
67
Id.
62
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back before the Board following an earlier remand from the Court. However, it is not entirely clear whether that is a blanket right that applies to
other situations where a claim is back before the Board after a separate
stage in the appellate process. For example, a veteran may appeal a regional
68
office denial to the Board and request a Board hearing. The testimony put
forth during that hearing may prompt the Board to send the veteran’s claim
back to the RO for additional evidentiary development, such as locating
69
missing treatment records or obtaining a needed VA examination. Although the veteran may choose to waive regional office consideration and
send the case directly back to the Board for a new decision, he or she may
also opt to have the RO consider the additional evidence and render a new
70
decision based thereon. If the RO does so, and continues to render an unfavorable decision, could the veteran then request an additional hearing before the Board renders a new decision on his or her claim?
In such an instance, the issue the Board would be considering, such as,
for example, service connection for a back disability, would likely be unchanged from the previous hearing. The Board would be considering new
evidence, but the issue itself would remain the same. The Court pointed out
in Cook that the issue on appeal had shifted from the time of Mr. Cook’s
71
first hearing to the time that he requested his second. While the Court
stated that reading the statute as prohibiting the claimant from testifying at a
Board hearing “where the issue on appeal had shifted” was counter to the
stated purpose of a hearing and inconsistent with the pro-claimant VA ap72
peals system, it is unclear if the Court’s interpretation would apply to an
instance where the issue on appeal had not “shifted.” From the Court’s later
statement, that a veteran is “not barred” from requesting and receiving a
hearing at a separate stage of the appeal, it appears this right would likely
remain following a remand from the Court, even if the issue on appeal remained the same. It is not certain, however, that the right would apply to the
hypothetical situation described above, where a veteran’s claim is back in
front of the Board following additional development at the RO level.
Answering this question would require the Court to explain how it defines a “stage” of the appeal, and how broadly or narrowly it would define
what constitutes a “separate issue.” Taking the hypothetical situation of the
veteran whose claim for service connection for a back disability is re-

68

See 38 C.F.R. § 20.200 (1992); 38 C.F.R. § 20.700 (1992).
See 38 C.F.R. § 20.1506 (2008); 38 C.F.R. § 19.9 (1992).
70
38 C.F.R. § 20.1508 (2008).
71
Cook v. Snyder, 28 Vet. App. 330, 342-343 (2017).
72
Id. at 343.
69
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manded from the Board to the RO then winds up back before the Board,
would this be considered a separate “stage” of the appeal, or is it a continuation of the earlier stage? Furthermore, if the veteran sought a separate
hearing so that he could offer testimony on the inability to locate certain
evidence, or to challenge the adequacy or factual conclusions of a VA examination, could that be considered a “separate issue,” if his or her first
Board hearing focused entirely on a description of the in-service injury and
current symptoms? Or would requesting a hearing on such issues be akin to
seeking a hearing “at any time on any issue for any reason,” which the
73
Court expressly rejected in Cook? Does the Board maintain any discretion
in making such a determination?
It is likely that such questions cannot be answered solely from the
Court’s interpretation of section 7107(b) and its holding in Cook. What is
clear from Cook is that when a veteran who has previously testified before
the Board seeks a new hearing at a subsequent stage of the appeal, particularly following a remand order from the Court, he is not barred from receiving a new hearing by the statute’s use of the phrase “an opportunity for a
74
hearing.” Whether or not the Board must unequivocally grant such a request, or whether such a request made at a different stage of the appeals
process must be afforded the same consideration, likely remains uncertain.
Following Cook, it appears that at the very least the Board must provide legally sound reasons and bases if it denies a request for a subsequent Board
75
hearing, regardless of when that request is made. If the Board denies such
a request, but articulates that it is doing so because the “stage” of the appeal
has not changed and/or the issue on appeal remains the same, Cook does not
go so far as to hold that the Board’s decision will automatically be remanded for that reason alone if and when it is appealed to the Court.
As the Court suggested, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs may wish to
promulgate a new regulation resolving the ambiguity in the statute and pro76
viding clarity on the issue. However, it is clear from the Court’s reasoning in Cook that veterans and their representatives will want to take a close
look at whether an additional hearing may be worthwhile or necessary in
putting forth the strongest case possible, particularly following a previous
remand order from the Court, even if the issue on appeal remains unchanged. This must be weighed against the additional time it may take for
73

Id. at 345.
Id. at 341.
75
See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d) (“Each decision of the Board shall include--a written statement of the
Board’s findings and conclusions, and the reasons or bases for those findings and conclusions, on all
material issues of fact and law presented on the record[.]”).
76
Cook, 28 Vet. App. at 345-346.
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the veteran to receive a final decision on his or her claim. It is clear that the
Board can no longer ignore or deny such a request simply on the basis that
the veteran was previously afforded a hearing, as the Board decision on ap77
peal in Cook did. Whether the Board maintains the discretion to deny such
a request, if it articulates adequate reasons or bases for its decision to do so,
likely must still be addressed on a case by case basis. This is likely to remain the case unless and until the Secretary promulgates a new regulation
aimed at resolving the remaining ambiguity.

77

See id. at 334. (quoting the Board decision: “The [v]eteran was afforded a Board hearing in June
2012. He also presented testimony before the RO in September 2007. The transcripts have been associated with the record. As the [v]eteran has been afforded a Board hearing, no further hearing is necessary.”).
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